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CASE COMMENT
CARTER V. ASSOCIATED PETROLEUM CARRIERS
E. F. Duncan, doing business as Duncan Oil Company,
hauled oil products under a lease with Associated Petroleum
Carriers, which contained a provision requiring Duncan to
indemnify Associated for claims and awards made under the
Workmen's Compensation Act. Accordingly, Duncan, whose
business had only two employees and therefore did not come
under the Workmen's Compensation Act by operation of law,
on October 3, 1955 contacted J. M. Hiers, of Hiers-Clarkson
Insurance Co., a registered agent for Iowa Mutual Insurdnce
Co., and applied for the necessary insurance coverage on an
Iowa Mutual blank furnished by Hiers, discussed with Hiers
the terms of the coverage, and paid Hiers one-half of the
annual premium. Hiers represented that he was acting as
the agent for the Iowa Mutual Co., accepted the premium in
that capacity, and stated that the coverage was effective
immediately. The following day, Hiers deposited Duncan's
check. Relying upon the arrangement with Hiers, Duhcan in-
formed his employees, including the deceased, that they were
covered as of that time by workmen's compensation. On Oc-
tober 5, Brady R. Carter, an employee, was killed in an
accident concededly arising out of and in the course of his
employment.
Upon being notified, Hiers immediately went to the scene
of the accident with Duncan, and later employed one Lynch
to make an investigation. Meanwhile, Duncan informed the
deceased's wife that deceased was covered by workmen's com-
pensation. On October 9 or 10, Lynch advised Duncan that
he represented Iowa Mutual, and that Carter's widow would
be paid. Subsequently, Iowa Mutual denied liability and at-
tempted to return the premium, which Duncan refused to ac-
cept.
At a hearing before the single commissioner, Hiers stated
that he had received a letter from Defendant's southern office
dated October 6 refusing Duncan's application, but there was
no showing that Duncan or any other party of interest was
informed of the letter. It does appear however that when
Associated requested evidence of insurance from Duncan,
Hiers at Duncan's request advised Associated on October 12:
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The application has been received.... However, the policy
has not been issued up to this date, and we are, there-
fore, unable to give you a formal certificate of insurance.
We will immediately advise you upon further information
from our Southern Division Office.
This application was processed in our offices on October
3, 1955 and payment received on the same day.
The South Carolina Industrial Commission allowed recov-
ery under the Workmen's Compensation Act and the award
was affirmed by the Common Pleas Court of York County.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina reversed, holding the
judgment void for lack of jurisdiction of the Industrial Com-
mission, Justices Taylor and Moss dissenting.'
This comment concludes that the decision incorrectly re-
solved the issues involved and that this represents an unfor-
tunate, and perhaps unintentional, departure from the
Court's well-established prior holdings interpreting the Act
liberally in furtherance of its remedial purposes.
In prescribing the method by which an exempt employer,
such as Duncan, may come under the Act, Section 72-109 of
the Code provides:
Employers exempted may waive exemption. Any per-
son employing employees in the State and exempted from
the mandatory provisions of this article may come in
under the terms of this title and receive the benefits
and be subject to the liabilities of this title by filing
with the Commission a written notice of his desire to
be subject to the terms and provisions of this title. Any
such person shall come under the provisions of this title
and be affected thereby thirty days after the date of such
notice.2
In considering the application of this election section we
must, of course, bear in mind the intent of the legislature
and the previous decisions of the South Carolina Supreme
Court. Previous rulings of the Court have held that the Act
should be given a liberal construction in furtherance of the
purposes for which it was designed ;3 that compensation laws
constitute a form of social legislation and were enacted pri-
1. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 235 S. C. 80, 110 S. E. 2d
8 (1959).
2. CODE OF LAWS o SOUTH CAROLINA § 72-109 (1952).
3. Alewine v. Tobin Quarries, 206 S. C. 103, 33 S. E. 2d 81 (1945).
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marily for the benefit, protection, and welfare of the work-
ing man and his dependents; 4 and that it is the established
law of this State that any reasonable doubt as to the con-
struction of the workmen's compensation law must be resolved
in favor of the claimant.5
In Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc." the South Carolina
Court held in 1941 that substantial, rather than exact, com-
pliance with Section 72-109 would suffice to bring an ex-
empt employer under the Act. There, an exempt employer
purchased workmen's compensation insurance and the car-
rier notified the Industrial Commission, which assigned code
numbers to the employer and the insurance company. The
Court overruled contentions that the employer had not filed
"written notice" of intent to come under the Act.
It would seem, keeping in mind the basic purpose of the
Act, that the logical extension of the aforementioned rulings
would allow recovery in the instant case. The majority of the
Court, however, found two principal difficulties: first, that
Duncan had not substantially complied with the Act, and
secondly, that even if he had, there could be no coverage un-
til the lapse of thirty days3
In considering whether Duncan had elected to come under
the Act, the majority quoted extensively from Eaves v. Con-
tract Trucking Co.,8 a 1951 New Mexico case. There the em-
ployer had purchased an insurance bond and filed it with
the clerk of court, but had not given "written notice" to the
clerk as required by the New Mexico election provision. The
New Mexico Court refused recovery on the grounds that the
employer had not complied with the statute. The Eaves case
is so similar to the Yeomans case in this respect that the two
holdings seem plainly inconsistent and the South Carolina
Court seems to have abandoned its previous liberal interpre-
tation in favor of the more restricted view of the New Mexico
Court.
The Eaves decision which was quoted by the South Carolina
Court states :9
4. Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S. C. 157, 14 S. E. 2d 899 (1941).
5. Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S. 0. 66, 7 S. E. 2d 712 (1940).
6. Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 198 S. C. 65, 15 S. E. 2d 833,
136 A. L. R. 894 (1941).
7. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, supra note 1.
8. Eaves v. Contract Trucking Co., 55 N. M. 463, 235 P. 2d 530
(1951).
9. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 235 S. C. 80 at 83, 110
S. E. 2d 8 at 10 (1959).
[Vol. 12
3
Craver: Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers
Published by Scholar Commons,
CASE COMMNT
The Legislature did not leave room for doubt by merely
saying an employer could elect to become subject to the
Act. It stated he could elect by doing certain, definite
and prescribed things in a specific way and limited his
election to be made by the doing of such specific acts in
the prescribed manner.
Any persuasive effect this reasoning had on the South Caro-
lina Court becomes even more interesting when it is noted
that the New Mexico Court in 1953 expressly overruled the
Eaves case and abandoned the rationale above in favor of the
liberal South Carolina view of the Yeomans case.
In Garrison v. Bonfield, the New Mexico Court again had
under consideration their election provision which is similar
to the South Carolina section. In this case the employer had
purchased an insurance bond but had not filed it with the
clerk of court, nor had he given "written notice". In reversing
a dismissal by the lower court, the New Mexico Court said :10
The appellees strongly rely upon our decision in Eaves
v. Contract Trucking Company, 55 N. M. 463, 235 P. 2d
530, where we squarely held the failure of the employer
in a non-hazardous occupation to file a written election
in the office of the clerk of the district Court rendered
the employer and his insurer immune to action under
the act, although the bond was actually filed, basing the
decision upon the wording of the act and the case of
Keeney v. Beasman, 1936, 169 Md. 582, 182 Atl. 566, 103
A. L. R. 1515, and making reference to the case of Lester
v. Auto Haulaway Co., 1932, 260 Mich. 216, 244 N. W.
219. A majority including the writer, believe the holding
in the Eaves case was too strict and that the decision
should have gone the other way in accordance with the
rationale of Yeomans v. Anheuser-Busclh, (1941, 198
S. C. 65, 15 S. E. 2d 833, 136 A. L. R. 894).
It is easy to see the trial court was controlled by our
holding in the Eaves case, supra, which we have overruled
in this opinion.
It appears, then, that the South Carolina majority departed
from their own sound rationale in the Yeomans case in favor
of the more restricted view of the Eaves case apparently
unaware that the New Mexico Court had already overruled
10. Garrison v. Bonfield, 57 N. M. 533, 260 P. 2d 718 at 720 (1953).
1960]
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that case in favor of the more liberal South Carolina reason-
ing expressed in the Yeomans case.
The other case seemingly persuasive with the majority,
which the Court called "strikingly similar", was the Ken-
tucky case of Cody v. Combs.-1 In that case the claimant, a
widow, had reached an agreement with the employer that
she was entitled to workmen's compensation benefits under
a policy the employer had acquired some three months be-
fore the death of her husband. However, the insurance com-
pany intervened on the grounds that there had been no elec-
tion to come under the act.
The Supreme Court of Kentucky refused to allow recovery
saying that the statute applies only where both the employer
and employee have accepted the provisions of the Workmen's
Compensation Act in the manner prescribed by the Act. In the
Cody case, however, the Kentucky Court was dealing with a
statute which required an affirmative act on the part of the
employee, i.e., signing a register of acceptance,'2 while in the
instant case the South Carolina Court was dealing with a
provision which requires nothing affirmative on the part of
the employee. In South Carolina an employee is presumed to
have accepted upon the election of the employer unless he
gives written notice that he does not wish to come under the
Act.' 3 In addition to the important difference between the
statutes, the fact that the Legislature of Kentucky subse-
quently amended the election provision to include employees
unless they filed written notice to be excluded,'4 indicates
that the Cody case was not a desirable result in the judgment
of the Legislature.
Returning to the principal case, the majority pointed out
that even if the act of the employer in securing insurance and
informing his employees accordingly was considered an elec-
tion, such election was not effective for thirty days.' 5 It is
suggested, though, that a logical extension of Yeomans, hav-
ing in mind the basic remedial purposes of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, would render Section 72-109 directory
rather than mandatory. Concerning this question, the dissent-
ing opinion stated:
11. Cody v. Combs, 302 Ky. 596, 194 S. W. 2d 525 (1946).
12. Ibid.
13. Kennerly v. Ocmulgee, 206 S. C. 481, 34 S. E. 2d 793 (1945).
14. Wells v. Jefferson County, 255 S. W. 2d 462 (Ky. 1953).
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The term "may" as used in the permissive part of Sec-
tion 72-109, Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1952, gives
the employer a right to come in. The use of the word
"shall" only applies where the positive action of writ-
ten notice is given timely effect as will be seen by an
analysis of said section .... The thirty day provision of
the above quoted section provides a manner in which the
employer, if he makes an election to come under the act,
may have his election become effective thirty days after
giving of the notice without further ado on his part, or
that of his employee, and should the employee acquiesce
in the employer's election for thirty days after the no-
tice, the employee, not having given notice to the con-
trary, would be bound by the election which he has not
protested. There is nothing, however, in the act to pro-
hibit the contracting parties from coming under the
provisions of the act at an earlier time or immediately
if it be desired. Were this not so, an employer would be
required to wait the full thirty days before the act would
become effective and at the same time pay premiums on
insurance coverage which would be non-existent because
of the thirty day waiting period, as the policy, when is-
sued, bears the date of application. 16
With deference to the majority, it is suggested that the in-
terpretation of the minority is the better view. As pointed
out by Justice Taylor in the dissent, such an interpretation
is reasonably within the wording of section and would be ad-
vantageous to employers as well as employees. In addition,
it seems highly improbable that the Legislature, designing an
act for the benefit of employers and employees, would word
it so as to make it impossible for the principals to take ad-
vantage of the Act without waiting thirty days. The minority
view would allow immediate coverage where immediate cov-
erage was the intent of the parties.
In cases where an employee had not indicated acceptance
and the thirty day period of acquiescence had not passed, the
employee would be entitled to use his common law remedies.
Obviously the employee would not lose his right to reject
coverage.
A valid argument against the foregoing result is that in
certain situations an employee would virtually have an elec-
tion of remedies for the thirty day period. The majority
16. Id. at 93, 110 S. E. 2d at 16.
19601
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view, however, contains the greater evil of requiring both
the employer and the employee to be without the protection
of the Act in all cases for thirty days, although the employer
has purchased compensation insurance, and all the involved
parties desire immediate inclusion under Section 72-109. In
this situation the employee has his common law remedies
though both he and the employer intended to accept the Work-
men's Compensation Act and the insurance was purchased in
good faith. Clearly the benefit of any "twilight zone" should
accrue to the employer or employee.
In disposing of claimant's contention that estoppel should
be invoked, the majority points out that the prevailing rule
is that the Industrial Commission cannot acquire jurisdic-
tion by estoppel, or by agreement, waiver or conduct of the
parties.' 7 However, in some jurisdictions estoppel is a basis
for preventing an insurer's escape from liability under the
workmen's compensation acts. Thus, the Kentucky Court, on
the ground of estoppel has held an employer liable although
he had not filed the required written notice and, hence, did
not come under the statute.' S The New Mexico Court held
that the issue of estoppel in workmen's compensation cases
is a fact question for the fact-finding body.' 9 Although the
South Carolina Supreme Court had not previously decided the
precise question, in Ham v. Mullins Lumber Company,20 it
adopted with approval the circuit judge's decision which, in
rejecting the defendant's contention that its non-compliance
with the Workmen's Compensation Act avoided any liability
under that statute, declared: "Under these facts, defendants
are clearly and completely estopped to deny liability, and I so
hold." If estoppel may operate to prevent injustice in work-
men's compensation cases, the instant case is an obvious can-
didate for application of that doctrine! As Mr. Justice Taylor
noted for the dissent:
Under the circumstances of this case, I am convinced
that Iowa Mutual Insurance Company is estopped from
denying liability by questioning the jurisdiction of the
commission and thereby being advantaged by reason of
the fact that the employer did not formally file written
17. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, s-uprn note 15.
18. L. E. Marks Co. v. Moore, 251 Ky. 63, 64 S. W. 2d 426 (1933).
19. Garrison v. Bonfield, 57 N. M. 533, 260 P. 2d 718 (1953).
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The South Carolina Court has repeatedly held that any
reasonable doubt as to exclusion or inclusion of workers must
be resolved in favor of inclusion. 22 Further, the Eaves-Gar-
rison sequence of decisions in New Mexico is a striking illus-
tration of an appellate court consciously substituting a
broader for a more restrictive interpretation of statutory
coverage in recognition of the superior South Carolina ration-
ale. As was pointed out previously, the strictness of the Cody
case was legislatively overruled in Kentucky in favor of a
presumption that the employee is included unless he gives
written notice otherwise. Consequently, even before these de-
cisions were referred to in the instant case, they had been
overruled for a more liberal view in their own jurisdictions.
Although the case of Miller v. Aetna Life was distinguished
from the instant case by the South Carolina majority, the po-
sition of the Montana Court that the rules of the Commission
were for the benefit of the employer, the employees, and
the industrial commission and not for the benefit of the in-
surer, seems well-taken.
23
To prevent insurers from escaping liability after accept-
ing premiums, we have seen different courts use different
approaches. New York has adopted what we may term "legis-
lative estoppel" in some instances, stating in the act that
under certain conditions the carrier is estopped to deny lia-
bility.2 4 Such action should not be necessary under the South
Carolina Act, however, as the highly respected jurist, Learned
Hand, noted in Guiseppi v. Walling, "... [T] here is no surer
way to misread any document than to read it literally.12 5
In summation, it is believed that the instant decision is an
unfortunate departure from prior sound decisions of the South
Carolina Supreme Court, and it is to be hoped that the de-
cision will be expressly overruled or limited to its facts, and
the sequence of South Carolina cases liberally interpreting
21. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 235 S. C. 80 at 94, 110t
S. E. 2d 8 at 16 (1959).
22. Ham v. Mullins Lumber Co., 193 S. C. 66, 7 S. E. 2d 712 (1940);
Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S. C. 157, 14 S. E. 2d 899 (1941); Hor-
ton v. Baruch, 217 S. C. 48, 59 S. E. 2d 545 (1950).
23. Miller v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 101 Mont. 212, 53 P. 2d 704 (1936).
24. N. Y. Workman's Compensation Law § 55 (McKinney 1946).
25. 144 F. 2d 608 at 624 (2d Cir. 1944).
1960]
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26. For an excellent discussion of the existence of an oral contract
of insurance between the employer and the carrier, see Mr. Justice Tay-
lor's dissent. Carter v. Associated Petroleum Carriers, 235 S. C. 80 at
91, 110 S. E. 2d 8 at 14 (1959).
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